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FACTUAL GROUNDS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a vehicular accident between Plaintiff William Morton and a
vehicle owned by Defendant Continental Baking Company.
FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL
1.

The Complaint in this matter was originally filed July 15, 1991. R. 3.

2.

This matter has been set for trial four times. The first trial date was

continued to give Plaintiff time to retain expert witnesses; the second due to the fact
Plaintiff was scheduled for surgery. R. 59, 63.
3.

The third trial date of January 11, 1994 was continued because Plaintiff

attempted to introduce new evidence and new legal theories of an expert witness, Dr.
Philip Hoyt, the day before the trial was to begin. R. 107; Memorandum Decision, p.
1, Appendix 5.
4.

In dealing with Plaintiffs attempt to introduce this new evidence, the

District Court held, "[r]ather than exclude the evidence, the Court reset the trial in
order to give the Defendant time for discovery." Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5.
5.

Three days after the trial was continued, Defendant served on Plaintiff

interrogatories and a request for production of documents dated January 14, 1994 to
obtain information about these new theories and evidence. R. 160, 142-138.
6.

Defendant, among other questions, specifically requested in its

interrogatories that Plaintiff identify the new evidence which Plaintiff was going to
1

introduce through the expert, Dr. Hoyt. The interrogatory requested and Plaintiff
belatedly responded as follows:
(9)
Please state whether the plaintiff anticipates that the previously
identified expert, Dr. Philip Hoyt, will testify differently or in areas other than those
specifically identified in his deposition previously taken in this case. If additional
and/or different testimony is anticipated which is any way inconsistent with,
supportive of, or addresses new areas of subject matter not fully and completely
addressed in his deposition, state the following:
(a)
the new subject matter upon which Phil Hoyt will or may testify at trial;
(b)
the general substance of any new testimony or new areas which the
expert will provide at trial, including opinions held by Mr. Hoyt
concerning the issues in this action;
(c)
educational background, employment experience, or individual
experience as an expert witness which the plaintiff believes qualifies Mr.
Hoyt to provide such testimony; and
(d)
documents or other factual materal (i.e., photographs, videotapes, etc.)
relied upon by the expert to render new testimony or testify in new
areas.
(9)
Just as Don Remington is being provided these answers and asked to
respond to the preceding question, Dr. Hoyt will also be given these answers
and asked to answer this question. When the answer is received, it will be
forwarded to you.
(Emphasis added.) R. 145-146, Appendix 4.
7.

Despite the fact that Plaintiff had represented to Defendant and the

Court that the evidence was ready to be presented at trial on January 11, 1994, for
over two months Plaintiff failed to respond to the discovery requests and failed to
respond to Defendant's letters of inquiry. Finally, on March 18, 1994, Defendant
filed a Motion to Compel Discovery. R. 137; see also Memorandum Decision,
Appendix 5, p. 2.

2

8.

Plaintiff did not file any response to Defendant's Motion to Compel.

See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 2.
9.

A Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion to Compel for Decision, mailed

to Plaintiff on March 29, 1994, was received by the Court and filed on March 31,
1994, pursuant to the mailing certificate attached to the notice. R. 161.
10.

Plaintiffs counsel admitted that he was fully aware of the outstanding

discovery requests and that a motion to compel had been filed. R. 239, H 8.
11.

In light of Plaintiffs complete failure to respond to the Motion to

Compel, the Court contacted Defendant and directed counsel to prepare an Order
giving Plaintiff ten days from the date of the Court's Order to provide answers to the
discovery requests or face the sanction of dismissal of the case. R. 221; see
Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 2; see also Order, Appendix 1.
12.

Under the terms of the April 12, 1994 Order, Plaintiff had "10 days from

the signing of this Order, until 5:00 p.m. on the tenth day, to deliver to Defendant full
and complete responses" to the discovery requests. R. 164; Appendix 5.
13.

The certificate of mailing attached to the Order indicates that the Order

was mailed to Plaintiff on April 12, 1994. R. 163. Brian Hale, a member of
Defendant's counsel's staff, also provided an affidavit in which he averred that he
personally directed that the Order be placed in the U.S. mail. R. 296. Lynn Javadi,
Defendant's counsel's secretary, also testified by affidavit that she personally placed
the April 12, 1994 Order in the U.S. mail. R. 308.
3

14.

Defendant did not receive answers to compelled discovery by the April

22, 1994 deadline. R. 218. See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 2.
15.

On April 25, 1994, Defendant filed and served upon Plaintiff, by hand-

delivery, a Motion for Entry of Judgment to dismiss the case along with an Order of
Dismissal. R. 226; See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 2.
16.

John Braithwaite, a partner in the law firm of Hanson, Epperson &

Smith, personally delivered the Motion to Dismiss For Failure to Comply With Order
Compelling Discovery to Plaintiffs counsel's offices on April 25, 1994. R. 290.
17.

Plaintiff also claims that he did not receive either the hand-delivered

Motion to Dismiss For Failure to Comply With Order Compelling Discovery which
was hand-delivered by John Braithwaite (R. 239), or the Order granting motion to
compel which was duly mailed to Plaintiffs counsel (see paragraph 13 above), or the
Notice to Submit for Decision, mailed to Plaintiff on March 29, 1994. R. 162.
18.

On April 28, 1994, the District Court signed the Order of Dismissal. R.

19.

After the Court dismissed the matter, Plaintiff sent to the Court a

229.

certificate of delivery, certifying that he had faxed discovery answers to Defendant on
April 25, 1994 (the day that the Motion to Dismiss the case was hand-delivered to
him) and had mailed them to Defendant on May 6, 1994. R. 237.
20.

Plaintiffs response to the discovery requests which he represented to be

ready to present at trial were completely non-responsive and did not comply with the
4

requirement of the April 12, 1994 Order which required Plaintiff to provide "full and
complete responses".
21.

In fact, Plaintiffs answers, belatedly faxed to Defendant on April 25,

indicate that the interrogatories had not even been given to Dr. Hoyt at the time
Plaintiff responded. Plaintiff responded to interrogatory no. 9 regarding the
testimony of Dr. Hoyt (quoted in paragraph 6 above) as follows:
(9)
Just as Don Remington is being provided these answers and asked to
respond to the preceding question, Dr. Hoyt will also be given these answers
and asked to answer this question. When the answer is received, it will be
forwarded to you.
(Emphasis added.) Answers to Interrogatories, Appendix 4.
22.

On May 11, 1994, Defendant filed a Notice of Signing of Judgment (R.

232), and mailed a copy to Plaintiffs counsel. R. 239, 1 10. Plaintiff acknowledges
receiving this notice which was sent in the same manner in which the previous
pleadings had been served upon Plaintiff. R. 232.
23.

On May 11, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief From Judgment and

supporting memorandum asserting that the service of the Notice of Entry of
Judgment received on May 9, 1994 was his first indication that an order had been
entered, or that the case had been dismissed. R. 249.
24.

Plaintiff admitted in his Memorandum that he "intended to answer those

discovery requests" and that he was "aware of the Motion to Compel". R. 248, 1 6, R.
247, 1 8.
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25.

Plaintiff argued for relief from judgment because he was unaware of the

outcome of the Motion to Compel or that an Order had been entered. R. 242-246.
Plaintiffs counsel based his argument on his own excusable neglect in failing to act to
respond to the motion in a timely manner. R. 242.
26.

On May 20, 1994, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition (R.

379), and on May 26, 1994, Plaintiff replied. R. 395.
27.

The Court denied Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment on May

26, 1994, finding no reason to grant the motion. R. 398.
28.

On June 9, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment Due to

Fraud and to Extend Time for Appeal and memorandum in support. R. 405;
Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5.
29.

Plaintiff argued that Defendant's attorney had affirmatively defrauded

the Court in obtaining the dismissal and that the Court had failed to follow
procedural rules in dismissing the case. R. 405.
30.

Despite the fact that the Plaintiff did not timely request oral argument

of his first Motion for Relief from Judgment, on June 16, 1994, the Court vacated its
earlier Memorandum Decision and granted Plaintiff the opportunity for oral
argument on his several motions to set aside the judgment on July 5, 1994. R. 408.
31.

On June 14, 1994, the Court signed an Order extending the time of

appeal to 30 days after final resolution of Plaintiffs pending motions. R. 407.

6

32.

On June 17, 1994, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiffs Motion for Relief Due to Fraud (R. 419) and on June 20th Plaintiff
replied. R. 436.
33.

On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Order of Dismissal

dated April 28, 1994 and memorandum in support. R. 447.
34.

On June 27, 1994, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition. R.

35.

On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Strike Order dated

468.

April 12, 1994 and a memorandum in support. R. 452.
36.

On June 27, 1994, Defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition. R.

37.

On July 5, 1994, the Court held oral argument on all of the motions

472.

filed by Plaintiff requesting relief from judgment. R. 477.
38.

On August 29, 1994, the District Court authored a lengthy Memorandum

Decision rejecting each and every request for relief brought by Plaintiff.

R. 484;

Appendix 5.
39.

An Order reflecting the Court's reasoning and decision was entered on

September 22, 1994. R. 496; Appendix 6.
40.

Notice of Appeal was filed on September 29, 1994. R. 498.

7

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion for

Relief from Judgment Dated May 11, 1994, based on Plaintiffs failure to show
excusable neglect.
Standard of Review.
When ruling on a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, the district court
will be given broad discretion and, on appeal, its determination will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989);
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).

2.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to

Set Aside Judgment Due to Fraud where Plaintiff failed to show any fraud on the
part of Defendant's counsel.
Standard of Review.
When ruling on a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, the district court
will be given broad discretion and on appeal its determination will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989);
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).

3.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to

Strike Order of April 12, 1994, compelling discovery.
8

Standard of Review.
The standard of review of a court's order granting a motion to compel is
reviewed for an abuse of the court's discretion. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950 (Utah 1989).

4.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to

Strike Order of April 28, 1994, dismissing the case.
Standard of Review.
The standard of review of a court's order dismissing a case for failure to
comply with ordered discovery is reviewed for an abuse of the court's discretion.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989).

5,

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs

claim for failure to respond to discovery, failure to file an opposition to a motion to
compel and failure to respond to the Order compelling discovery within the time
required by the Court Order.
Standard of Review.
A party's failure to comply with an order for discovery may be met with the
sanction of dismissal by the court. Tucker Realty Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410 (Utah
1964). The standard of review of a court's order dismissing a case for failure to
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comply with ordered discovery is reviewed for an abuse of the court's discretion.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989).

6.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion by sanctioning

Plaintiffs counsel for making accusations of fraud on the part of Defendant's counsel
with no basis in fact.
Standard of Review.
The court's imposition of sanctions for a pleading made without any basis in
fact will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.2d
163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court properly denied Plaintiffs 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment.
Plaintiff failed to show mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect justifying relief.
Plaintiff also failed to show any fraud on the part of Defendant's counsel which would
justify relief from the judgment.
The Court also properly found that the express purpose of continuing the trial
was to permit Defendant to conduct further discovery regarding new theories which
Plaintiff represented he had ready to present at trial.
The Court also properly rejected Plaintiffs claim that Rule 6 applied to extend
the deadline for filing the discovery responses pursuant to the Court's Order
compelling discovery.
10

Further, the Court properly found that Rule 4-504 did not apply to extend
Plaintiffs time to respond to the Order compelling discovery. The Rule was rendered
inapplicable because the Court did not allow review of the Order by Plaintiff but
"otherwise ordered" it, thus excepting the Order in question from the application of
the rule.
The Court was not persuaded that the Plaintiff was unaware that the Order
compelling discovery had been entered. The Court properly ruled that Plaintiff was
aware that the Order compelling discovery had been entered based on the certificate
of mailing attached to the Order and the affirmative proof provided by affidavits
submitted in the record.
The Court properly ruled that Plaintiff had failed to show any evidence that
Defendant's counsel had committed fraud in procuring the dismissal. The Court's
Order that Plaintiffs counsel personally pay Defendant's attorney's fees for such a
serious allegation with no factual foundation should not be reversed on appeal.
Alternatively, the judgment may be affirmed because the Plaintiffs responses
to the discovery which were served did not comply with the Court's Order.
Specifically, the responses received were not "full and complete responses" as
required by the language of the Court's Order.
The District Court, in its sound discretion, properly dismissed Plaintiffs
Complaint for Plaintiffs failure to respond to discovery requests and Orders.
Plaintiff not only completely failed to respond to the discovery requests of Defendant
11

which he represented to be ready to present at trial, but he also failed to respond to
the motion to compel discovery knowing the Court would grant the motion.
Plaintiffs conduct before and after the Judgment was entered merits the censure of
dismissal which the Court imposed.
The following will show that each of the arguments raised on appeal are
subsumed in the greater question of whether the Court abused its discretion in
ordering the discovery, dismissing the case for Plaintiffs failure to provide the
discovery and in denying his motions for relief from judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT DATED MAY 11, 1994, BASED ON PLAINTIFFS
FAILURE TO SHOW EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
When ruling on a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, the district court
will be given broad discretion and on appeal its determination will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989);
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment on May, 11, 1994. R. 249.
He argued that his failure to serve the ordered discovery prior to the deadline was
excused because he failed to receive notice of the Court's Order. R. 246. Plaintiff
also repeats several of the arguments he made to the Court below which, although
not technically before the Court, are addressed in I. A-E, below.
12

With respect to his claim of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect,
Plaintiff admitted that he was aware of the discovery, but that he simply was unaware
of the Order compelling discovery which imposed the April 22, 1994 deadline. R.
248. In response, the Court rejected the argument and his offer of excusable neglect
stating, in the Court's opinion, based on the certificates of mailing, certificates of
hand-delivery and his prior conduct, that Plaintiff, "knew of the order compelling the
answers to the interrogatories and failed to answer them in the allotted time." R.
481.
With that finding in place, the Court was in a position to determine that
Plaintiffs error was not caused by mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect and
that relief under Rule 60(b) would not be proper. Rather, the Court addressed each
of Plaintiffs several theories for relief. See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5.
The Court held that Plaintiffs actions demonstrated a willing failure to respond to
the discovery or the Court's Order and that none of the legal arguments were
persuasive. While dismissal of the Plaintiffs claims for repeated failure to respond to
discovery, motions and orders of the Court may be a harsh sanction, it was well
within the discretion of the Trial Court and should not be disturbed on appeal.
A.

The Trial Was Continued For The Express Purpose Of Obtaining
Further Discovery By Defendant.

Primary to the appeal is Plaintiffs premise that discovery was not reopened.
Plaintiff contends Defendant's service of the interrogatories and request for

13

production of documents was improper and required no response. This contention is
an invention of desperation and is summarily rejected in the Court's Memorandum
Decision. The Court stated:
This case was originally filed on July 15, 1991. It has been set for trial four
times and has involved a significant amount of legal maneuvering. The last
continuance was requested the day before trial was to begin because the
Plaintiff purportedly had new evidence and theories to be given by expert
witnesses at trial. Defendant's counsel argued that it would be unfair to
proceed without an opportunity to discover the new evidence and become
adequately prepared. Rather than exclude the evidence, the Court reset the
trial in order to give the Defendant time for discovery.
Memorandum Decision, p. 1; Appendix 5 (emphasis added).
Notably absent from Plaintiffs Brief is the Court's Memorandum Decision
which details these procedural facts and conclusions of the Court. (Appendix 5.)
Also absent from the record is any objection to the discovery Defendant propounded
within the time permitted by the rules. See U.R.C.P. 33(a). Plaintiffs assertion on
appeal that discovery was not reopened flies in the face of the fact that the entire
trial was continued based on "new evidence and theories to be given by expert
witnesses at trial." See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5, p. 1.
Further, Plaintiff has previously acknowledged that he "intended to respond" to
the discovery and, in fact, had begun to put together responses to the request. R.
240, I 6. Plaintiffs own admissions and conduct inconsistent with his argument
demonstrate that he was fully aware of the requests and had no objection to them as
being untimely or improper under any scheduling order.
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Had Plaintiff truly believed the answers to be proper, his recourse was to file a
timely objection to the requests or, at least, object to the Motion to Compel. See
U.R.C.P. 33. The fact that he did nothing whatsoever to object to the propriety of
the discovery requests is fatal to his claim on appeal, especially in light of the Court's
specific holding that discovery was reopened to prevent Plaintiffs evidence from
being precluded at trial.
Plaintiffs contention that the Court erred by dismissing the case because
responding to the discovery was a gratuitous and optional gesture on his part
illustrates the lack of substance to this appeal. With the express consent of the Court
and lack of a new scheduling order setting a deadline, the discovery was properly
propounded and Plaintiffs failure to respond to the discovery was the basis for the
case being dismissed. The Court did not err below and the judgment dismissing the
case must be affirmed.
B.

U.R.CP. Rule 6(e) Does Not Apply To Extend The Time To Respond
To A Court Order With A Specific Deadline.

Plaintiff also asserts that Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should
have operated to give him an additional three days to respond to the Order
compelling discovery and that if the three days were applied, the answers were timely
filed. Plaintiff, however, fails to explain to this Court the actual facts which render
Rule 6(e) inapplicable.

15

On April 12, 1994, in response to the unopposed Motion to Compel discovery,
the Fourth District Court contacted counsel for Defendant and requested that he
prepare an Order giving Plaintiff ten days from the date of the signing of the Order
to answer the discovery requests or face dismissal. Defendant prepared the Order at
the request of the Court. The Order itself did not require Plaintiff to respond Vithin
10 days" but stated, "Plaintiff shall have 10 days from the signing of this Order, until
5:00 p.m. on the tenth day, to deliver to Defendant full and complete responses . . .."
See Order of April 12, 1994, Appendix 1; R. 164.
Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that three days will be
added to the calculation, "whenever a party has the right or is required to do some
act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice
or other paper on him." U.R.C.P. 6(e) (emphasis added). The plain language of the
Rule applies to deadlines with a fixed number of days to respond, such as the time
for filing an opposition to a motion (Code of Judicial Administration, 4-501) or the
time to file answers to interrogatories. See U.R.C.P 33(a). However, where the
court sets a specific deadline like a discovery cutoff, or specifically requires answers
by a certain date, the parties are not entitled to enlarge the period simply because
the court's order was mailed to them. See Bachman v. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 85
F.R.D. 10 (D.C. S.C. 1979).
The plain language of the April 12, 1994 Order compelling discovery required
Plaintiff to respond by a specific time rather than within a fixed number of days after
16

service. R. 164. As a result, Rule 6(e) is entirely inapplicable to extend the period
for response to the Order compelling discovery.
Plaintiffs selective memory of the events fails to present the full factual
picture to this Court. Plaintiffs argument is merely an attempt to turn the focus
away from his own failure to timely respond to discovery requests and the Motion to
Compel by invoking rules of procedure which do not apply.
G

Plaintiffs Duty To Respond To Discovery Or A Motion To Compel Is
Not Extended By Rule 4-504.

Plaintiff further argues that somehow Rule 4-504 makes the April 12, 1994
Order compelling discovery by April 22, 1994 ineffective because he did not have five
days to approve or object to the Order.
Plaintiffs proposed application of this rule makes no sense. The fact that
Plaintiff has five days to object to a proposed order of the court does not excuse the
obligation to obey a signed order of the court. Furthermore, an objection to the
signed order setting a specific deadline does not extend the deadline imposed by the
order until the matter is resolved under the rule.
However, application of Rule 4-504 to this particular case need not be decided
on appeal because the exception to the general rule set forth in Rule 4-504 directly
applies to this case. Rule 4-504 generally requires an order be submitted to the other
party, who then has five days to object before the order is submitted for the court's
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signature. However, the rule does not apply when the court "otherwise orders". See
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504.
In this case the Court specifically directed Defendant to prepare and submit
the April 28, 1994 Order of Dismissal directly to the Court, thereby constituting an
exception to Rule 4-504(2). See, Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(2).
Plaintiff fails to distinguish or even address the exception in his brief.
Second, Plaintiffs failure to timely file discovery responses has nothing to do
with the requirement that Plaintiff be notified of a signed judgment or order of the
court dismissing the case. Once again, Plaintiffs argument is merely pretext to
excuse Plaintiffs own failure to file discovery answers in a timely manner. The Court
did not abuse its discretion and dismissal should be affirmed.
D.

Plaintiff Received A Copy Of The April 12, 1994 Order As Reflected By
The Certificate Of Mailing.

While it is unclear why Plaintiff believes he has the right to object or respond
to the April 12, 1994 Order, Plaintiff still fails to rebut the presumption that he knew
of the deadline based on the certificate of mailing dated April 12, 1994. R. 163. The
certificate of mailing is corroborated by the affidavits of Bryan Hale and Lynn Javadi
of Defendant's counsel's office. R. 296, 308.
Plaintiff further ignores the fact that he acknowledged he received the Motion
to Compel and that he did not respond. Additionally, Plaintiff ignored the Notice to
Submit for Decision, mailed to him on March 29, 1994. R. 162. This failure to
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diligently pursue the case by filing a responsive pleading to the Motion to Compel
left him the responsibility to find out what the Court had done, especially when he
knew or should have known that the Motion to Compel had been submitted to the
Court for decision. R. 162. See Affidavit of Plaintiff dated May 11, 1994. R. 239,
18. Plaintiffs bald assertion that he did not receive the Order is insufficient to rebut
the affirmative evidence that the Order was mailed to him based on the certificate of
mailing filed with the Court and the affidavits of Brian Hale and Lynn Javadi, which
are in the record. R. 296, 308.
In a prior case before this Court, Mr. Snuffer attempted to argue that his
general office procedure was sufficient to establish compliance with court
requirements. See, Litster v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933, 940-41
(Utah App. 1994). This Court in Litster, rejected Mr. Snuffer's claims by holding that
conclusory evidence of "general office policy" was insufficient to establish that he had
complied with statutory notice requirements in that case.
Similarly here, Mr. Snuffer states only generally that he "at all times intended
to aggressively pursue this claim, and to protect the claim of the Plaintiff." As in
Litster, Mr. Snuffer does not forward any affirmative proof that the Order was not
mailed by Defendant. As in Litster. he merely concludes that if his office would have
received the various notices and orders, those pleadings would have been brought to
his attention and responses would have been made because office procedure
mandated it. In Litster, the Court did not allow Mr. Snuffer's office procedures to
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overcome his obligation of providing affirmative proof of mailing notice. See Litster
at 941. The Court here should hold that Mr. Snuffer's attempted reliance on general
office procedures is insufficient to overcome the Defendant's affirmative proof of
mailing of the March 29, 1994 Notice to Submit, the April 12, 1994 Order and the
hand-delivery of Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment on April 25, 1994. R.
290. Significantly, Defendant has met the burden required in Litster by affirmatively
establishing that documents were served upon Plaintiff by way of the certificates of
mailing, a certificate of hand-delivery and the subsequently filed affidavits specifically
averring service occurred. R. 296, 308.
Plaintiff's argument that he has diligently pursued this matter at all times and
that he should not be punished for the failure of the post office or the system would
have some credibility if Plaintiff had bothered to respond to the discovery requests in
any manner. It would be entitled to some weight if he had filed an opposition to the
Motion to Compel. However, where the Plaintiff did not even bother to respond to
an informal inquiry from counsel regarding his failure to respond to the discovery,
and where he completely failed to respond to a motion he knew would be granted
since it was not responded to, his claims of clean hands and faultless conduct ring
hollow.
Further, Plaintiffs counsel's conduct from entry of the judgment forward in
blaming the mails, the Court, and finally accusing Defendant's counsel of affirmative
fraud, all illustrate Plaintiffs counsel was unwilling to admit any fault, error or
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oversight on his part. While the sanction of dismissal may be harsh, the District
Court is in a much better position to determine whether the circumstances require
such action. Because there is no indication that the Court abused its discretion, the
rulings of the Court should be affirmed on appeal.
E.

Plaintiffs Argument That Dismissal Is Too Harsh A Sanction Is Baseless
In Light Of His Own Actions of Willful Refusal To Cooperate In
Discovery.

Rule 37 provides that a party may be sanctioned by dismissal of its claim
where it fails to cooperate in discovery. See. U.R.C.P. 37(2)(A)-(C). Plaintiff merely
argues that dismissal is too harsh in light of his otherwise diligent efforts in
prosecuting the action.
Plaintiffs counsel argues that it would be a grave injustice to deprive his client
of a trial for the failure of the mail system to inform him of the Order which caused
him to miss the deadline by one business day. The Plaintiff portends to have gone to
herculean efforts to prepare and prosecute this matter. However, when it came time
to respond to discovery which Plaintiff represented he was prepared to offer at trial,
his diligent pursuit seems to have come to an abrupt halt. The Court asked the
following questions to which Plaintiff could not provide an answer:
With all this at stake, why would counsel fail to answer the
interrogatories or at least provide partial answers to opposing counsel
when they were due? Why would counsel, knowing a motion to compel
was filed, not respond to the Court in any way? Why would he not
provide the answers he had? Why would he not seek an extension of
time from the Court if he were having difficulty obtaining the
information? Why, if he were ready to present at least part of the
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information at trial on January 11, 1994 could he not produce it to
counsel within the time limits of the rules.
R. 480 (emphasis added); Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5.
Plaintiffs appeal to this Court on the bare record cannot reflect the knowledge
the District Court had, based on the representations of the parties and their conduct
in the Court below. The Memorandum Decision reflects a careful synthesis of the
Court's knowledge of the entirety of the events surrounding this case and should not
be disturbed on appeal. Appendix 5.

n.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE JUDGMENT DUE TO FRAUD WHERE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
SHOW ANY FRAUD ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL.
When ruling on a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, the district court
will be given broad discretion and on appeal its determination will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989);
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).
Plaintiff filed another Rule 60(b) Motion with the Court on June 9, 1994
seeking relief from the judgment. R. 419. The Motion merely repeats the arguments
made in the earlier Motion for Relief but adds specific arguments and allegations
that Defendant's counsel committed fraud in obtaining the judgment. R. 405.
The Court, in its Memorandum Decision, specifically ruled that Defendant's
counsel's conduct did not constitute fraud. R. 479. The Court also noted that the
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serious nature of the accusations absent any basis in fact was sufficient to merit
personal sanctions against Plaintiffs counsel. R. 479.
The factual premise of Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment based on
fraud was unsupported by any reference to or basis in fact. As a result, the Court was
well within its sound discretion in denying the Plaintiff relief from judgment due to
fraud.
III.
THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE COURT WERE PROPER BASED
ON PIAINTIFFS NUMEROUS BASELESS MOTIONS AND
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AGAINST DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY.
Plaintiff states that because the answers were timely and proper, Defendant
should not have been entitled to sanctions or attorney's fees. The Plaintiff fails to set
forth the reasoning of the Court in granting the attorney's fees below which clearly
justifies their imposition. See Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5.
One of the several motions for relief asserted that Defendant's attorney
affirmatively defrauded the Court in obtaining the Order compelling discovery and
dismissal of the case. R. 419. After oral argument of the matter, the Court, in its
Memorandum Decision, found none of the elements of fraud were present or shown
and that Plaintiff had made serious allegations against Defendant's attorney without
any factual basis. The Court stated:
the representation(s) of the Defendant were not false and no fraud was
committed. . . . Further, because of the serious nature of the accusation
by Plaintiffs attorney and the fact that Plaintiffs failure to respond was
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rather the result of a basic error on his part, the Court will order
Plaintiffs attorney to personally pay the Defendant's attorney's fees in
litigating this motion.
R. 479; Memorandum Decision, Appendix 5.
Even if this Court were to reverse the matter, the baseless allegation of fraud
in and of itself merits the censure imposed by the District Court. Plaintiffs conduct
in accusing counsel of fraud as a result of Plaintiffs own conduct is beneath the
dignity which should be present in the legal forum. There should be no tolerance for
allegations which directly impugn the character of a member of the bar that have no
basis in fact. The Court's decision regarding sanctions was clearly not abused and
must be affirmed on appeal.
IV.
THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED P1JVINTIFFS CLAIMS FOR THE
ALTERNATIVE REASON THAT THE RESPONSES PROVIDED TO
DEFENDANT WERE NOT FULL AND COMPLETE ANSWERS TO THE
DISCOVERY REQUEST AS ORDERED BY THE COURT.
A party's failure to comply with an order for discovery may be met with the
sanction of dismissal by the court. Tucker Realty Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410 (Utah
1964). A court's order dismissing a case for failure to comply with ordered discovery
is reviewed for an abuse of the court's discretion. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989).
In this case the entire trial was continued based on the representation by
Plaintiff that he had new expert reconstruction evidence of Dr. Hoyt to present at
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trial the following day. R. 484, 480. To learn what testimony and conclusions the
expert held, Defendant immediately requested the opinions and conclusions of the
expert be identified by answers to interrogatories. R. 160; R. 273 (affidavit of Terry
M. Plant indicating the failure of Plaintiff to provide full and complete responses to
the discovery requests).
However, the April 25, 1994 answers which Plaintiff served on Defendant
failed to provide any of the information sought in the requests, let alone "full and
complete" answers as the Order compelling discovery required. Id. Plaintiffs
responses merely indicated that the expert was going to be sent information on other
witnesses and experts and that his conclusions and opinions were unknown to Plaintiff
at the time. R. 256-58, Appendix 4.
Therefore, even if the answers, by some stretch of the imagination, can be
deemed timely, they were incomplete and did not satisfy the requirements of the
April 12, 1994 Order compelling "full and complete answers" to the discovery
requests. Dismissal of the case may be upheld for the alternative reason that Plaintiff
failed to supply complete answers to the discovery requests as ordered by the Court
even though he represented to the Court that he was ready to proceed to trial over
three months before.
The arguments in this area regarding Plaintiffs failure to provide complete
answers to discovery illustrate that the Court was familiar with all of the procedural
aspects of the case. The Court knew the positions of counsel prior to trial and what
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the Plaintiff had represented regarding the testimony of the experts Plaintiff was
going to call. The Court's decision to dismiss the case was based on its intimate
knowledge of the case and conduct of counsel and should not be disturbed on appeal
based on an emotional plea for mercy.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs prosecution of the appeal without reference to the entire body of
evidence upon which the District Court based its ruling illustrates the duplicitous
nature of Plaintiffs assertions below and on appeal. Based on a review of all of the
relevant papers submitted by the parties, the District Court's Memorandum and
Order can only be reasonably seen in one light; that the Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Plaintiffs Request for Relief from Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion
to Set Aside Judgment Due to Fraud, and Motion to Strike Order of Dismissal. To
conclude otherwise would be to tolerate disregard of the rules of procedure and
authority of the District Court to enforce its Orders. The judgment of the District
Court dismissing Plaintiffs case should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this ^ S a y of

fek

1995.

HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

TERRY M. IQZANT
BRADLEY R. HELSTEN
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing motion by mailing a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, this
fesguAgy

, 1995, to the following:

DENVER C. SNUFFER, JR.
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
William W. Morton
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH,
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
)
P. O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM W

-10RTON,

]

I

]
|

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO COMPEL AND
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES

vs.
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
|

Civil No. 910400454PI
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.
The mot io 1:1 • ::>£ th : defendant

:

• ?ompe 1 the plaintiff t ::>

j

w h i c h w e r e s e r v e d 01 1 t h e p l a i n t i f f
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r about

h a v i n g b e e n c o n s i d e r e d by t h e C o u r t , auu P l a i n t i f f
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iiiiie
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11 ml i on

or
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to

the

January

*94

having i n e u
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above-referenced

discovery,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff
£
!;

-1 0

1 lays

I rem

I he

signing

o

• ..

Order,

until

clock p.m. on the tenth day, to delivei: to Defendant full

and complete responses

LU tiie interrogator i es

production of documents *« question (copies of which were attached
t

;>• defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities

Support

suffer sanctions in accordance with Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which will be the dismissal of all of Plaintiff's
claims

for relief.

Further, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the

defendant be granted its attorney fees and other costs incurred in
bringing its motion to compel. Said costs and attorney fees are to
be supported by an appropriate affidavit or other proof.
DATED this /*L,

day of

. 1994.

HOgp^ABLE RAY M. HARD<1
District Court Judge

_CER^fe&ICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES, postage prepaid, this
1994, to the following:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorney for Plaintiff
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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-^ day of April,
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Post Office Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC

OR

UTAH COUNTY, STATE i
WILLIAM W

MORTON,

JTAH

;

Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Civil No. 910400454PI
i Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.
The Court, having considered the defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure l:o comply with order compelling discovery and
o r r u n IIIJII

tin ni ni ill

ui I I i ( l i t i,' n
i I

.

.

.

a

previously ordered that the plaintiff would have i
from, the date of thi" order compelling discover'
on till: le t e i i t 1 1 day , I

i la I

s
-

" : •'- ^.m.
;,•.--•

r e s p o n s e s t o t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and request s t o : p r o d u c t i o n of
documents which were s u b j e c t
*

: 3 u i u c i , emu having o r d e r e d
so comply w i t h f.lie o r d e r , t h e

p l a i n t : i : w :u. . . , ! ; • - ; s a n c t i o n s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Rule
t i i t uidu x\uxct> u i C i v i l Procedu,ii:eiir which wuiiiiJ ILm1 I h<» ui

- -L

of all of the plaintiff's claims for relief, having reviewed this
matter, being fully advised in the premises, and finding good
cause therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with order
compelling discovery is granted.

The Court finds that the

plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court's order dated April
12, 1994. Based upon the plaintiff's failure to comply, and the
sanctions indicated in the order, all of the plaintiff's claims
in this action are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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FILED IK
4 r H DISTRICT COURT
STAT;: : - ! ; - A H
UT:,;' ; •••!::TY

TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH,
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite
1)
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE Ob' UTAH
WILLIAM W. MORTON,
NOTICE OF SIGNING
OF JUDGMENT

PlainHff,
vs.
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Civil No. 910400454PI
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.
COMES NOW
accoL'dance. with Hu

rocedure

58A(d)

through its counsel of

and hereby gives the plaintiff
record, Denver C. Snuffei .
against

.

the plaintiff dismissin

udgment *

r>
•

~::

, . ,„,,

••:: '-*.^„

entered

r. h t?

against the defendar
order

ni ilismiasa

.

tonorable Ray

dardinc

att.ai.'hixi Lo this notice of signing c: judgment.
DATED this

day of May, 1 993
JON, EPPERSON & SMITH

TERI^
Attorn^ for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Sui te 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2 97 0

=

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Signing of Judgment, postage prepaid, this
day of May, 1994, to the following:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorney for Plaintiff
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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Denver C. Snuffer, J r. 3 03 2
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 8 4 070
Telephone: ("ni ) ^6-1400
IN AND FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM W

MORTON,
CT.RT1 T J - ' A I T

P.] aJ i iti f f,

. !•' I ELI VEKY

vs.
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,

Ci v i1 No 9104 00 4 54 P1
Honorab1e Judge Harding

Defendant.

1

hereby

certify

that

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

I'l nnt iff'«" An W M , i<> u**\ eiukuit"" s Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents were facsmiled on Apr i 1 2 5 , 2 994 and mai led
postage prepaid with

•:

ittachmentf

Ildnt:, HANSON, hPP.

. ^d

Lake City, Utah .
DATED this (ft

day of

T

un Ma^
n

~

• ,^r

-.

%1

^^:
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 3032
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 94070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
IN AND FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM W. MORTON,
i
i
]

Plaintiff,
vs.
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,

I
I

ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S
INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 910400454PI
Honorable Judge Harding

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure hereby answers Defendant's Interrogatories to
Plaintiff as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Identify each and every person

known to the plaintiff or his representative who was at the
accident scene in question on December 29, 1989, from an hour
before the accident in question up to an including a week after the
accident in question. This is meant to include all persons at the
accident when it occurred, shortly thereafter, and all persons
known by the plaintiff to have visited the accident scene during
the 7 days after the accident.
ANSWER:

To the best of Plaintiff's knowledge these are

the following individuals who were at the accident scene shortly
thereafter and up to one week after the accident: William Morton,
Stan Holyoak, Marvin Clark, Gayle Pike, Marvin Ainge, Shane Drage,
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G a m Hooley, Ken Zupon and Tim Hobbs.
INTERROGATORY NO, 2:

For each person identified in

response to Interrogatory No. 1, state the name, address, telephone
number, social security number and employer of said person.
ANSWER:
Stan Holyoak:

This information

is already

in the

is already

in the

possession of the Defendant.
Marvin

Clark:

This information

possession of the Defendant.
Gale Pike: Works for Savage Industries, can be contacted
through them.

His home address is 9949 Sego Lilly, Sandy, Utah.

Marvin Ainge:

Works for Savage Industries.

Plaintiff

has learned that he has just moved to Payson, Utah.
Shane Drage: Worked for Savage Industries but is now an
independent trucker working out of Idaho. We do not have a current
address.
G a m Hooley:

Works for Savage Industries.

We have no

Works for Associated Foods.

We have no

Works for Associated Foods.

We have no

address or phone number.
Ken Zupon:
address or phone number.
Tim Hobbs:
address or phone number.
INTERROGATORY NO, 3:

For each person identified in

response to Interrogatory No. 1, provide a detailed statement of
the reason why said person was at the accident scene, the events
observed or information gained by said person at the accident
scene, and any testimony the plaintiff anticipates eliciting from

said witness as part of the evidence to be produced at trial in
this matter.
ANSWER;
Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory because it is
asking the Plaintiff to speak for witnesses that are not affiliated
with nor controlled by the Plaintiff.

The only information that

the Plaintiff has in his possession is the best understanding that
Plaintiff has of what these witnesses know.

Therefore, Plaintiff

cannot answer the question as propounded. However, without waiving
such objection, Plaintiff answers as follows:
Stan Holyoak was a mechanic for Johnson Oil and was sent
to inspect the damage to the tractor and to salvage parts from the
tractor after the accident which were not insured. He also went to
the accident scene sometime within the first week and inspected the
scene.

While we cannot speak for the witness, we anticipate that

the witness will testify that he inspected the truck after the
accident and saw that its transmisson had split, that the impact to
the transmission was such that the main gear fell out the bottom of
the broken transmission housing and that the entire transmission
grease would have been immediately lost from the size of the crack.
He will testify to the oil weight and volume in the transmission.
He also has driven the same trailer-pup rig that was being driven
by Woody Morton on the day of the accident.

He worked on the

trailer-pup vehicles and maintained them. When the brakes on these
rigs are engaged the pup would engage its brakes first and the
trailer would engage second and later.

When the pup is empty,

although it is a dual wheeled vehicle, it has a camber to its axle

and rides on its outside tires. When the pup is loaded with fuel,
it rides on all of its tires.

He has skidded the trailer-pup

before when driving with them, and has seen the kind of mark that
the vehicles leave on the roadway.

He visited the scene of the

accident and recognized skid marks that were left by the pup at the
scene which can now be seen in several photographs of the scene.
Marvin Clark was the safety inspector for Johnson Oil and
inspected the tractor as well as the scene of the accident.

He

took several photographs at the scene and will identify them. They
show that highway department spread dirt into the lane of travel
belonging to the Woody Morton vehicle after the accident to cover
fluid spills, but there were no efforts to place dirt into the
other lane of travel because of the absence of any significant
fluid spills.
Gayle Pike is a driver for Savage Industries and was
there prior to the arrival of police and medical personnel.

He

walked the accident scene prior to the arrival of the police and
he, Marvin Ainge and Shane Drage were the drivers who spoke with
Officer

Pelton.

statements

made

Both he and the others
by

Trooper

Pelton

prior

can testify
to

beginning

about
his

investigation to the effect that Woody Morton was responsible for
causing the accident.

Gayle Pike can testify as to the layout of

the accident scene. He saw the paramedics remove Woody Morton from
the vehicle and helped in that process.

Since Gayle is not a

party to the suit but a witness the Plaintiff does not control his
testimony. To the extent that Plaintiff has any recorded statement
from the witness, it is being provided with these answers.

Marvin Ainge:

Marvin Ainge is a driver for Savage

Industries and was the first driver who stopped at the scene of the
accident. Mr. Ainge was traveling East. Mr. Ainge was there prior
to the police and he also walked the accident scene. He can offer
information as to the accident scene and the condition of Mr.
Morton.

Since Mr. Ainge is not a party to the suit but a witness

the Plaintiff does not control his testimony.

To the extent that

Plaintiff has any recorded statement of Mr. Ainge, it is being
produced. Mr. Ainge was the first vehicle stopped in the direction
from which Mr. Morton was traveling and there were no other
vehicles between his vehicle and the accident itself. He does not
believe that the skid marks in Woody Morton's Ian* of travel were
left by his vehicle.

His truck-trailer-pup rig had an overall

length of 92'3" and had eleven axles: the driving axle with two
tires, followed by two driver axles with four tires each on the
tractor, three axles with single tires on each on the rear of the
trailer, two axles with super-single tires on each on the front of
the pup-trailer and three axles with single tires on each on the
rear of the pup. He is acquainted with the kind of skid mark left
by the rig he was operating and the skid mark in Mr. Morton's lane
of travel near the accident is not the type that his rig would
leave on any of the three components to his vehicle.

He can also

recall talking with Trooper Pelton about the tracks left by a
passing vehicle that had gone through the accident scene before
anyone else arrived. That vehicle had tracked fuel and grease away
from the accident scene leaving tracks that went from Woody
Morton's lane of travel into the Wonder Bread truck's lane of

travel. Trooper Pelton said these were Mskid,f marks left by Woody
Morton's truck and that they showed how Mr. Morton had traveled on
the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident. Mr. Ainge
argued with him saying that the marks were clearly diesel fuel
tracks and not skid marks. Trooper Pelton also said that the truck
of Mr. Morton had spun either 180 or 360 (he can't recall which) on
the road after the accident, which Mr. Ainge also thought was not
correct.
Shane Drage:
Savage Industries.

At the time of the accident he worked for

He was one of the drivers who stopped at the

scene of the accident. He walked the scene of the accident and was
also the one who had discussion with Pelton upon his arrival.

He

can testify about statements made by Trooper Pelton prior to
beginning his investigation to the effect that Trooper Pelton knew
who was responsible for the accident without looking the scene over
and that it was Mr. Morton's fault. Shane Drage has information as
to the layout of the accident scene and the condition of William
Morton.

Since Mr. Drage is not a party to the suit the Plaintiff

does not control his testimony.
G a m Hooley:

Works for Savage Industries and was one of

the drivers who stopped at the accident scene. He walked the scene
of the accident.

It is not determined at this time of any

testimony will be elicited from G a m Hooley.

If in the future

Plaintiff intends to use Garn Hooley any testimony he may offer
will be disclosed to the Defendant.
Ken Zupon:

Works for Associated Foods.

He was also

another driver who stopped at the scene of the accident. Plaintiff

has not determined at this time if any testimony will be elicited
from Ken Zupon.

If Mr. Zupon can add any facts other than those

already disclosed by other witnesses, that testimony will be
provided to the Defendant.
Tim Hobbs:
scene.

Was the first driver through the accident

Tim Hobbs did not stop but proceeded on and called the

accident in at the cement plant.

It is not anticipated that any

testimony will be elicited from Tim Hobbs.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

For each person identified in

response to Interrogatory No. 1, state the time when Plaintiff or
his agents became aware that said person was at the accident site
in question, the method by which the plaintiff became aware of said
person's presence at the accident site in question and the method
by which the plaintiff learned of information known by each person
who was at the accident site.
ANSWER:

These individuals have become gradually known

to Plaintiff and some have not yet been interviewed.

Most of the

savage drivers became aware to the Plaintiff by word of mouth. The
first driver that Plaintiff became aware of was Shane Drage, the
exact date of this conversation is not known but is believed to be
sometime in mid-1993.

Upon talking to Shane Drage he identified

many of the other drivers who had stopped.

The two drivers of

Associated Food were disclosed through contact with associated food
through their personnel director. Plaintiff believes her name was
Nancy. Mr. Ainge was interviewed in April 1994 for the first time.
Mr. Pike was interviewed just prior to the last date this matter
was set for trial.

INTERROGATORY NO. 5;

Identify

all

employees

or

representative of Savage Trucking Company who the plaintiff was
aware were at the accident scene in questions for the time period
specified in Interrogatory No.l. If not provided above, state all
information concerning the representatives and employees of Savage
Trucking Company sought as to other persons in Interrogatories 2,
3 and 4 above.
ANSWER;

See answer to Interrogatory number 2 above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Identify

the

dispatcher

of

Savaga Trucking Company who was on duty at the time of the accident
in question.
ANSWER:

Plaintiff does not know at present.

INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Identify all persons known to

the plaintiff or his representatives known to have heard police
officers or other representatives of th$ state of Utah involved in
the

investigation

of the accident

ix\ question make

comments

concerning the investigation and specifically comments suggesting
that ^police officers were or may hav^ been biased against the
interest of the plaintiff and/or biased in favor of the deceased
agent of the deferidant, LeGrand Wilson.
ANSWER;

At present Plaintiff is only aware of three of

the dirivers who heard those remarks and they are identified above
in th§ prior answer to No. 2, above.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8;

Plea.se

state

whether

the

plaintiff anticipates that the previously identified expert, Don
Remington, will testify differently or in areas other than those
specifically identified in his deposition previously taken in this

case.

If additional and/or different testimony is anticipated

which is in any way inconsistent with, supportive of, or addresses
new areas of subject matter not fully and completely addressed in
his deposition, state the following:
(a)

the new subject matter upon which Don Remington will or

may testify at trial;
(b)

the general substance of any new testimony or new areas

which the expert will provide at trial, including opinions held by
Mr. Remington concerning the issues in this action;
(c)

educational

background,

employment

experience,

or

individual experience as an expert witness which the plaintiff
believes qualifies Mr. Remington to provide such testimony; and
(d)

documents or other factual material (i.e., photographs,

videotapes, etc.) relied upon by the expert to render new testimony
or testify in new areas.
ANSWER: This answer requires direct information from the
expert as to what his testimony will be.

We will supplement this

answer when Mr. Remington provides us an answer.

He is being

provided with these answers to Interrogatories and also with the
accompanying production of documents and asked to provide an answer
to this interrogatory.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

Please

state

whether

the

plaintiff anticipates that the previously identified expert, Dr.
Phillip Hoyt, will testify differently or in area other than those
specifically identified in his deposition previously taken in this
case.

If additional and/or different testimony is anticipated

which is in any way inconsistent with, supportive of, or addresses
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new ares of subject matter not fully and completely addressed on
his deposition, state the following:
(a)

the new subject matter upon which Phil Hoyt will or may

testify at trial;
(b)

the general substance of any new testimony or new areas

which the expert will provide at trial, including opinions held by
Mr. Hoyt concerning the issues in this action;
(c)

educational

background,

employment

experience,

or

individual experience as an expert witness which the plaintiff
believes qualifies Mr. Hoyt to provide such testimony; and
(d)

documents or other factual material (i.e., photographs,

videotapes, etc.) relied upon by the expert to render new testimony
or testify in new areas.
ANSWER:

Just as Don Remington is being provided these

answers and asked to respond to the preceding question, Dr. Hoyt
will also be given these answers and asked to answer this question.
When the answer is received, it will be forwarded to you.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

Please state whether the plaintiff

anticipates calling Mr. Greg Duval at the trial in this matter,
either as a witness
witness.

in their case in chief or as a rebuttal

If the answer to said interrogatory is yes, state in

detail:
(a)

the subject matter upon which Mr. Greg Duval will or may

testify at trial;
(b)

the general substance of his testimony which he will or

may provide at trial, including opinions held by Mr. Greg Duval
concerning the issues in this action;

(c)

the educational background, employment experience, and

the individuals experience as an expert witness, including each
and every trail at which he has testified as an expert witness in
the last 10 years, if any, and/or any other relevant information
which the plaintiff contends qualifies Mr. Duval to provide expert
witness testimony; and
(d)

documents or other factual material (i.e., photographs,

videotapes, etc.) relied upon by the expert to render new testimony
or testify in new areas.
ANSWER:

Yes, it is anticipated that he will be called

as a rebuttal witness. As to the other matters, Mr. Duval is being
provided with these answers and asked to review them and provide an
answer to this interrogatory in light of the information provided.
The witness' resume is being provided.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

Please state the name of each

and every additional expert witness not previously identified in
your

answers

to

these

interrogatories

anticipates calling at trial.
witnesses

who will

testify

whom

the

plaintiff

This is meant to include all expert
in any

regard,

including damages,

liability or other issues involved in this matter.
ANSWER:

Other

than

the

experts

already

disclosed,

including Paul Randall, and the two treating physicians, Plaintiff
at present does not intend on calling any new experts.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

For

each

expert

identified,

identify:
(a)

the subject matter upon which each expert will or may

testify at trial;
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(b)

the general substance of the testimony which each will or

may provide

at trial, including opinions held

by each expert

concerning the issues in this action;
(c)

the educational background, the employment experience,

and the individuals experience as an expert witness, including
each and every trial at which the individual has testified as an
expert witness in the last ten (10) years, if any; and
(d)

document or other factual material (i.e., photographs,

videotapes, etc,) relied upon by the expert to render new testimony
or testify in new areas.
ANSWER:

Not Applicable,

INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

Of

the

expert

witnesses

identified, please state whether or not any of the witnesses so
identified has visited the scene of the accident.

If said witness

has not yet visited the scene of the accident, please state whether
the plaintiff anticipates having said witness visit the scene of
the accident between now and the time of the trial in this matter.
ANSWER:

The only experts which Plaintiff has disclosed

that has not been to the scene of the accident is Dr. Philip Hoyt,
the economist and the treating doctors. It is anticipated that Dr.
Hoyt will at some point visit the scene of the accident.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14:
in

the

preceding

interrogatory

If an expert witness identified
had

visited

the

scene

of

the

accident in question, please state in detail the following:
(a)

all

measurements,

testing

or

other

investigative

activities performed by the expert at the scene;
(b)

the results of any testing or measurement, including a

statement of all items tested and/or measured;
(c)

the date or dates of any and all visits to the accident

scene were made.
ANSWER;

These have been previously provided except for the

future visit of Dr. Hoyt. This future material cannot, of course,
be produced in these answers.
DATED this j \

day of April, 1994.

William Morton
FER & DAHLE
Cv"SNUFFER
r6rney for Plaintiff
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 3032
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
IN AND FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM W. MORTON,

;

Plaintiff,

I
l

PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

I
1

Civil No. 910400454PI
Honorable Judge Harding

]

vs.

CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure hereby produces the following documents as follows:
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
1.

Copies of all plaintiff's drivers' logs and/or ICC

logs of any kind for the period of 11/29/89-12/29/89, including but
not limited to the logs referred to by the plaintiff in his
deposition taken March 3, 1992 on pages 23 and 24.
ANSWER:
2.

A

These documents do not exist any longer.
complete

copy

of

each

and

every

document,

including photographs and/or other resource materials of any kind
relied upon by each of the plaintiff's experts identified in answer
to

the

interrogatories

accompanying

these

requests.

It

is

anticipated that for each expert identified, the plaintiff will
produce to the defendant a complete and separate file of documents
relied upon.
ANSWER:

These have already been provided to you for Don
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Remington.

As to the other witnesses, they have now reviewed all

the State Highway photographs and video tape which is already in
your possession. They have also reviewed the photos taken of scene
thereafter by the Johnson Oil employee.

Although you have these

photos, a photocopy of these are being produced with these answers.
3.

A

complete

of

all

notes,

calculations

and/or

writings of any kind created by any of the expert witnesses
identified by the plaintiff in answers to the interrogatories
accompanying these requests, which were created by, relied upon or
which pertain to any of the opinions reached by said experts.

It

is anticipated that the plaintiff will produce a separate file for
each expert identified containing all notes, calculations or other
writings of any kind prepared by said expert.
ANSWER:

These have already been produced as to Dr. Hoyt

and Don Remington. As to Greg Duval, they will be provided to the
extent that they exist.
4.

To the extent not previously produced in responses

to requests number 2 and 3, copies of all file materials in
possessions of the plaintiff's experts, including but not limited
to resource material, research, material, and specifically all
documents comprising the various files utilized by, relied upon,
created by, or otherwise assisting the plaintiff's expert in
reaching opinions in this matter.
ANSWER: This request is overly broad and inappropriately
seeks to have produced work product that the Plaintiff has had to
pay to obtain.

The Defendant should not receive this information

without compensating the Plaintiff for it.
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5.

Copies of all statements, affidavits and/or other

records of testimony obtained by the plaintiff of any witness,
including but not limited to all witnesses, both expert and lay,
identified

by the plaintiff

in response to the

accompanying

interrogatories.
ANSWER:
6.

See accompanying documents.

All documents referred to or otherwise identified in

your answers to the interrogatories accompanying these requests.
ANSWER:
7.

See accompanying documents.

Copies of all pictures, photogramic studies or other

material in the possession of plaintiff, his representatives or
plaintiff's experts, which have been utilized by the plaintiff's
experts in arriving at their opinions in this matter.
ANSWER:
8.

These have already been produced.

Copies of all exhibits not previously identified or

produced which plaintiff anticipates offering at the trial herein.
ANSWER:
medical

x-rays

These have been produced except for certain
and

implant

devices

that

are

available

inspection at counsels office.
DATED this J* J" day of April, 1994.

/ci^w^v.
William Morton

ON^SjNDFFER fi^ DAHLE
/

^C/SNUFFER
Attorney for Plaintiff
10885 -'south State street
Sandy, Utah 84070

for
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Fourth Judioial District Court of
Utafc County, State of Utah.
CARMM SMITH Clerk
_ 0»puty

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MORTON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 910400454
DATE: August 29, 1994

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
CONTINENTAL BAKING CO.,

LAW CLERKS: Joe Morton, Laura

Defendant.

Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for ruling on a number of motions and objections
filed in this case since the filing of the Defendant's Motion to Compel on March 18, 1994.
Having received and considered the various motions and objections together with memoranda
both in support and in opposition to such, having reviewed the file and having heard the
argument of counsel on July 5, 1994, the Court makes the following findings:
1) This case was originally filed on July 15, 1991. It has been set for trial four
times and has involved a significant amount of legal maneuvering. The last continuance was
requested the day before trial was to begin because the Plaintiff purportedly had new
evidence and theories to be given by expert witnesses at trial. Defendant's counsel argued
that it would be unfair to proceed without an opportunity to discover the new evidence and
become adequately prepared. Rather than exclude the evidence, the Court reset the trial in
order to give the Defendant time for discovery.
2) Pursuant to this allowance for additional discovery, Defendant served
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on Plaintiff on or about January
1

14, 1994, three days after the third trial setting was to have begun.
3) Plaintiff did not respond to the Defendant's Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents, and on March 18, 1994, the Defendant filed a Motion to Compel
and a Memorandum in Support of Points and Authorities of Defendant's Motion to Compel
along with an order for the Court's signature.
4) In an affidavit filed May 11, 1994, Plaintiffs attorney admitted that he had
received the Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents as well as the Motion
to Compel.
5) Plaintiff failed to respond to the Motion to Compel and on March 31, 1994, the
Defendant filed a Notice to Submit for decision.
6) The Court reviewed the documents on April 12, 1994 and gave instruction that
Defendant's counsel prepare an order giving the Plaintiff 10 days from the date of the
signing of the order to fully and completely answer the interrogatories or face dismissal of
the case. This order was prepared in accordance with the Court's instructions and was
signed the same day. This signed order gave the Plaintiff until 5:00 p.m. on April 22, 1994
to complete the answers. A copy of the order was mailed to the Plaintiff.
7) The Defendant did not receive the answers by the deadline on the 22nd. On April
25, 1994, Defendant prepared a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Order
Compelling Discovery. A copy of this motion, its memorandum in support, and an affidavit
of Defendant's attorney Terry M. Plant, were hand delivered to the Plaintiff. An Order of
Dismissal was also submitted to the Court and a copy hand delivered to the Plaintiff.
8) Upon reviewing the affidavit of counsel on April 28, 1994, the Court signed the
Order of Dismissal.
9) On May 6th the Plaintiff sent to the Court a Certificate of Delivery certifying that
he had faxed answers to the interrogatories to the Defendant on April 25, 1994, and had
mailed them on May 6, 1994.
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10) On May 11, 1994, Defendant filed a Notice of Signing of Judgment, a copy of
which was sent to the Plaintiff on May 6th. Plaintiff acknowledges receiving this document
on May 9, 1994.
11) On May 11, 1994, Plaintiff began his response to the actions of the past month
and a half by filing his Motion for Relief From Judgment and supporting memorandum. On
May 20, 1994, Defendant filed his Memorandum in Opposition and on May 26th Plaintiff
replied. Finding no reason to grant the motion, the Court denied it on May 26, 1994.
Despite the fact that the Plaintiff did not timely request oral argument, on June 16, 1994, the
Court vacated its earlier Memorandum Decision in order to grant Plaintiff the opportunity for
oral argument on July 5, 1994. This motion will be addressed in this Memorandum
Decision. The Court has also received objections from both sides as to the form of the
other's submitted order. Since the Memorandum Decision has been vacated the Court will
not address either objection.
12) On June 9, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment Due to Fraud
and to Extend Time for Appeal and its memorandum in support. On June 14, 1994, the
Court signed an order extending the time of appeal. On June 17, 1994, Defendant filed his
Memorandum in Opposition and on June 20th Plaintiff replied. This motion will be
addressed in this Memorandum Decision.
13) On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Order of Dismissal dated
April 28, 1994 and its memorandum in support. On June 27, 1994, Defendant filed his
Memorandum in Opposition. This motion will be addressed in this Memorandum Decision.
14) On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Strike Order dated April 12,
1994 and its memorandum in support. On June 27, 1994, Defendant filed his Memorandum
in Opposition. This motion will be addressed in this Memorandum Decision.
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I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGEMENT DATED MAY 11, 1994.
In this motion the Plaintiff makes four arguments: 1) that the interrogatories were
answered on time, 2) that he was unaware that an order to compel had been signed or that a
request for judgement had been submitted, 3) that any failure on the part of the Plaintiff was
the product of mistake, inadvertence or neglect on the part of his attorney which should be
excused, and 4) that the Defendant failed to comply with the service requirements of Rule
4-501, Code of Judicial Administration.
Plaintiffs first argument is simply incorrect. Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
covers the computation of time. "[T]he day of the act [April 12] . . . shall not be included."
Thus, the 13th is the first day, the 14th the second and so on until the 22nd, which is the
10th day. The time for answering the interrogatories expired at 5:00 p.m. on April 22,
1994. Plaintiff admits the answers were received by the Defendant at the earliest on April
25, 1994. In short, the interrogatories were not answered in time.
Plaintiff next argues that he knew nothing of the Court's proceedings from the time
the Defendant filed his Motion to Compel on March 18, 1994, until May 9, 1994, when he
received the Notice of Signing of Judgment. During oral argument, counsel explained that
he has been having some problem with the mail. The Court's records indicate that six
documents were either mailed or hand delivered to the Plaintiff during that time. The Court
is not convinced by Plaintiffs assertions and finds that the Plaintiff, through his attorney or
his attorney's staff, knew of the order compelling the answers to the interrogatories and
failed to answer them in the allotted time.
Plaintiff next argues that to the extent the Plaintiff has failed to respond timely,
Plaintiffs counsel has done so mistakenly, inadvertently, or through neglect which should be
excused by the Court. Plaintiffs counsel appeals to the Court's sense of logic. He points
out that the case has been ready to go to trial on two prior occasions and that the Plaintiff
and his counsel "have invested years of time and considerable out of pocket costs in
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advancing this case." Plaintiffs counsel argues that he must have been unaware of the
deadline because if he had known of the deadline he would have complied with it.
This Court has similar questions. With all this at stake, why would counsel fail to
answer the interrogatories or at least provide partial answers to opposing counsel when they
were due? Why would counsel, knowing that a motion to compel was filed, not respond to
the Court in any way? Why would he not then provide the answers he had? Why would he
not seek an extension of time from the Court if he were having difficulty obtaining the
information? Why, if he were ready to present at least part of the information at trial on
January 11, 1994, could he not produce it to counsel within the time limits of the rules?
The Court does not know the answer to any of these questions; however, it does
know that it has not been offered any satisfactory explanation by Plaintiffs counsel. Any
mistakes, inadvertence and neglect which may have occurred at the office of Plaintiffs
counsel are not an excuse for the manner in which Plaintiffs counsel has handled this matter.
Plaintiff finally argues that the Defendant failed to comply with the service
requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration and claims that none of
the documents requesting judgment, i.e. the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply With
Discovery, the supporting memorandum with exhibits, and the Order of Dismissal, were ever
received by the Plaintiff. The Court notes that each has the required Certificate of Service
attached and the further affidavit of John Braithwaite attesting that he personally delivered
the documents to the office of Plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to refute
or call into question whether the documents were actually hand delivered as claimed. As
such, the Court will take the Certificates of Service at face value and find that the documents
in question were delivered to Plaintiffs counsel.
Not being persuaded by any of the arguments advanced by the Plaintiff, the Court
will deny the Plaintiffs motion.
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II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGEMENT DUE TO FRAUD AND TO
EXTEND TIME FOR APPEAL DATED JUNE 9, 1994.
In this motion, Plaintiff argues that he failed to respond to discovery requests due to
fraud and misrepresentations to the Court by Defendant.

The representations of the

Defendant were not false and no fraud was committed or attempted. As such, the motion is
denied. Further, because of the serious nature of the accusation by Plaintiffs attorney and
the fact that Plaintiffs failure to respond was rather the result of a basic error on his part,
the Court will order Plaintiffs attorney to personally pay the Defendant's attorney fees in
litigating this motion.
HI. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER OF DISMISSAL DATED APRIL 28,
1994 DATED JUNE 20, 1994.
Plaintiff argues that the Order of Dismissal was signed prematurely because the Court
should have given the Plaintiff 10 days in which to respond, in accordance with CJA Rule 4501, before it ruled on the motion.
While technically titled a motion, the purpose of the Defendant's documents was to
inform the Court that Plaintiff had failed to comply with the Court's earlier order and to ask
the Court to implement the sanctions prescribed in that order. The order signed on April 28,
1994, merely executes the sanctions of the earlier order.
Plaintiffs failure to file any response to the motion eliminates any standing the
Plaintiff has to claim that the memorandum was not considered. Moreover, in subsequent
affidavits the Plaintiff admits that its answers to interrogatories were not submitted by the
deadline imposed by the original order. Judicial economy and fairness are not furthered by
allowing the Plaintiff to argue a point that it has not preserved and that it admits it did not
comply with.
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WHEREFORE,
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 29th day of August, 1994.

cc:

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq.
Terry M. Plant, Esq.
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180)
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
)
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
)JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
)TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT DUE TO
)FRAUD AND TO EXTEND TIME FOR
APPEAL AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS
)TO STRIKE ORDERS OF DISMISSAL

WILLIAM W. MORTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

)

)
)

Defendant.

Civil No. 910400454PI
Judge Ray M. Harding

The following motions of the Plaintiff came before the
Court for oral argument on July 5, 1994:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion

for

Relief

from

Judgment

dated

May 11, 1994;
2.
and to Extend
3.

Plaintiff's Motion
Time for

Appeal

to Set Aside

Judgment

Due to

Fraud

dated June 9, 1994;

Plaintiff's Motion

to

Strike

Order

Dated

April

12,

1994 dated June 20, 1994; and
4. Plaintiff's Motion

April

28,

to Strike

Order

of Dismissal

Dated

1994 dated June 9, 1994.

The Plaintiff having been represented by Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and
the Defendant having been represented by Terry M. Plant, the Court
having reviewed all memoranda and objections filed by the various

counsel concerning each of the motions, as well as oral argument of
counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court makes the
following findings:
FINDINGS OF THE COURT
1.

This matter was originally filed on July 15, 1991.

The case has been continued four times. The last continuance was
requested the day before trial was to begin because the Plaintiff
purportedly had new evidence and theories to be given by expert
witnesses at trial.

Defendant's counsel argued that it would be

unfair to proceed without an opportunity to discover the new
evidence and adequately prepare himself.

Rather than exclude

evidence, the Court reset the trial to give the Defendant time for
discovery.
2.

Pursuant to the allowance for additional discovery,

Defendant served interrogatories and requests for production of
documents on or about January 14, 1994, three days after the third
trial setting was to have begun.
3.

Due to Plaintiff's

failure to respond

interrogatories and requests for production

to the

of documents, on

March 18, 1994 the Defendant filed a motion to compel, together
with a memorandum of points and authorities in support of its
motion to compel.
4.
Plaintiff's

In accordance with the affidavit of May 11, 1994 of
counsel,

he

admitted

-2-

that

he

received

the

interrogatories and requests for production of documents, as well
as the motion to compel.
5.

Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion to compel

and on March 31, 1994, the Defendant filed a notice to submit for
decision.
6.

The Court reviewed the documents on April 12, 1994

and gave instruction that Defendant's counsel prepare an order
giving the Plaintiff 10 days from the date of the signing of the
order to fully and completely answer the interrogatories or face
dismissal of the case. This order was prepared in accordance with
the Court's instructions and was signed the same day. This signed
order gave the Plaintiff until 5:00 p.m. on April 22, 1994 to
complete the answers.

A copy of the order was mailed to the

Plaintiff.
7.

The Defendant did not receive the answers by the

deadline on the 22nd.

On April 25, 1994, Defendant prepared a

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Order Compelling
Discovery.

A copy of this motion, its memorandum in support, and

an affidavit of Defendant's attorney Terry M. Plant were delivered
to the Plaintiff. An Order of Dismissal was also submitted to the
Court and a copy delivered to the Plaintiff.
8. Upon reviewing the affidavit of counsel on April 28,
1994, the Court signed the Order of Dismissal.
9.

On May

6, the Plaintiff

sent to the Court a

Certificate of Delivery certifying that he had faxed answers to the
-3-

interrogatories to the Defendant on April 25, 1994, and had mailed
them on May 6, 1994.
10. On May 11, 1994, Defendant filed a Notice of Signing
of Judgment, a copy of which was sent to the Plaintiff on May 6 by
the Defendant.

Plaintiff acknowledges receiving this document on

May 9, 1994.
11. On May 11, 1994, Plaintiff began his response to the
actions of the past month and a half by filing his Motion for
Relief from Judgment and supporting memorandum.

On May 20, 1994,

Defendant filed his Memorandum in Opposition and on May 26, 1994,
Plaintiff replied.

Finding no reason to grant the motion, the

Court denied it on May 26, 1994.

Despite the fact that the

Plaintiff did not timely request oral argument, on June 16, 1994,
the Court vacated its earlier Memorandum Decision in order to grant
Plaintiff the opportunity for oral argument on July 5, 1994.
Because the Court vacated its Memorandum Decision of May 26, 1994,
the objections to that order filed by both sides need not be
considered.
12.

On June 9, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set

Aside Judgment Due to Fraud and to Extend Time for Appeal and his
memorandum in support.
13. On June 20, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike
Order of Dismissal dated April 28, 1994 and his memorandum in
support, and a Motion to Strike Order Dated April 12, 1994 and his
memorandum in support.
-4-

ORDER OF THE COURT
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED as follows:
Plaintiff's Motion

1.

for

Relief

from

Judgment

dated

May 11, 1994 is hereby denied.
2. Plaintiff's Motion

and to Extend

Time for Appeal

to Set Aside

Judgment

Due to

Fraud

dated June 9, 1994 is hereby denied

and further, for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision
of the Court dated August 29, 1994, Plaintiff's attorney is to
personally pay Defendant's attorney's fees in litigating this
motion in the agreed-upon amount of $250.00.
Plaintiff's Motions

3.
Dated

April

12,

1994 and April

DATED this ^ ^

28,

to

Strike

Orders

1994 are hereby denied.

day of September, 1994.

-5-

of

Dismissal

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT DUE TO FRAUD AND TO EXTEND TIME FOR APPEAL AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONS TO STRIKE ORDERS OF DISMISSAL, this JX^
1994, to the following:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorney for Plaintiff
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

91-526.
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day of September,

